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ABSTRACT
Objective: The objective of the study was to
understand the extent to which financial incentives
such as Payment by Results and other payment
mechanisms motivate kidney centres in England to
change their practices.
Design: The study followed a qualitative design. Data
collection involved 32 in-depth semistructured
interviews with healthcare professionals and managers,
focusing on their subjective experience of payment
structures.
Participants: Participants were kidney healthcare
professionals, clinical directors, kidney centre
managers and finance managers. Healthcare
commissioners from different parts of England were
also interviewed.
Setting: Participants worked at five kidney centres
from across England. The selection was based on the
prevalence of home haemodialysis, ranging from low
(<3%), medium (5–8%) and high (>8%) prevalence,
with at least one centre in each one of these categories
at the time of selection.
Results: While the tariff for home haemodialysis is
not a clear incentive for its adoption due to uncertainty
about operational costs, Commissioning for Quality and
Innovation (CQUIN) targets and the Best Practice Tariff
for vascular access were seen by our case study
centres as a motivator to change practices.
Conclusions: The impact of financial incentives
designed at a policy level is influenced by the
understanding of cost and benefits at the local
operational level. In a situation where costs are
unclear, incentives which are based on the
improvement of profit margins have a smaller impact
than incentives which provide an additional direct
payment, even if this extra financial support is relatively
small.
INTRODUCTION
It is a major challenge for policymakers
worldwide to ensure that healthcare systems
provide good quality care at affordable costs.
Governments have been implementing
payment structures which are intended as
incentives for improving quality in healthcare
provision. In this study we looked at ﬁnancial
incentives in kidney care. As of 2011, more
than 53 000 people (0.08% of the popula-
tion) are in receipt of kidney replacement
therapy in the UK.1 This has been reported
to take up 2% of the National Health Service
(NHS) budget.2 New ﬁnancial incentives
have been aimed at kidney care in the past
few years to improve quality of delivered care
and to take care closer to people’s homes.
This is in line with the current general goals
within the NHS3 and speciﬁcally in kidney
care.4 These developments make kidney care
an interesting case for the study of the rela-
tionship between incentives and the uptake
of different methods of providing expensive
long-term care.
Evidence on incentives in healthcare
One of the ways health systems worldwide
strive to improve quality in healthcare is by
the use of ‘pay for performance’, linking
quality targets to provider revenues. This can
either involve a ﬁnancial reward or a penalty.
There has been considerable research into
the effectiveness of using monetary incen-
tives to improve quality in healthcare, largely
in the US context.5 6 Reviews of published
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Qualitative research provides unique insight into
how financial incentives for quality improvement
are perceived by kidney centres; this is important
in helping understand better how financial incen-
tives function in practice.
▪ Interviews at five kidney centres purposely
selected to represent variable prevalence of
home haemodialysis; however, does not give a
comprehensive overview of perceptions across
all kidney centres in England.
▪ Does not examine the actual costs and financial
benefits of different dialysis modalities or the
influences of patient preferences and wider
organisational factors in decision-making around
kidney care treatment modalities.
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evaluations have concluded that the research shows
either no, or only modest, positive impacts of pay for
performance on quality.7 A recent review of systematic
reviews shows that there is inconclusive evidence on
whether pay for performance has an effect on practice.8
Study results range from very positive to negative, with
most studies of insufﬁcient quality from which to draw
ﬁrm conclusions, and problems in comparability due to
the diversity in the design of pay for performance pro-
grammes. Eijkenaar9 discusses the different design ele-
ments of pay for performance programmes, concluding
that they should be broad but comprehensible, involve
healthcare providers in the design, give incentives to
groups rather than individuals, and should ideally be
decoupled from the base payment for the service.
Pay for performance in England
Despite inconclusive evidence on their effectiveness, gov-
ernments in many countries have in recent years
employed ﬁnancial incentives to improve quality. In
England, the Department of Health has employed
several forms of ﬁnancial incentives. In the primary care
sector, the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) was
introduced in 2004. This comprised an incentive system
paying up to 20% of the income of a general practi-
tioner’s practice,7 spanning both clinical and organisa-
tional aspects of care, as well as patient experience.10
At the same time the Department of Health also started
replacing the previous system of block contracts in the sec-
ondary care sector with Payment by Results, an activity-
based payment system with tariffs based on national
average costs, adjusted for casemix. On average about 60%
of a hospital’s activity is reimbursed via the tariff.11 The
tariff rewards providers for increasing productivity, should
encourage them to improve efﬁciency and hold tighter
control of costs, and also gives the Department of Health
the opportunity to incentivise high quality care by paying a
higher tariff price: the Best Practice Tariff. There were
15 Best Practice Tariffs active in 2012, rewarding those
practicing the best clinical care in, for example, acute
stroke care or total hip and knee replacements.11
A number of concerns have been raised over the use
of Payment by Results and Best Practice Tariffs, notably
the cost information on which the tariff is based.
A recent report12 found that reported unit costs can
differ substantially between providers without clarity on
whether this is due to real differences in costs or differ-
ences in allocation of costs or data collection. In add-
ition, substantial annual variations in the reported unit
costs on which the tariff is based mean that providers
are discouraged from making decisions based on the
cost-income balance of individual services, offsetting a
loss in one service by a proﬁt in another. Both these fea-
tures make the tariff less likely to achieve the intended
improvements in efﬁciency of services.
The Best Practice Tariff has been shown to have an
impact on achieving improvements in the areas of chole-
cystectomies and hip fractures, but not in the case of
stroke care, possibly because providers needed more
time to implement the incentivised changes in prac-
tice.13 The same evaluation found that clinicians tended
to be receptive to the Best Practice Tariffs, but to
increase the chance of success it is important that the
rewards outweigh the increased collection burden.
Another form of pay for performance is the
Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN)
scheme, introduced in 2009 with the intention to
‘support a cultural shift to make quality and innovation
part of the commissioner-provider discussion every-
where’.14 Clinical commissioners in local trusts—who
purchase a majority of healthcare services in the NHS—
play an active role in developing CQUIN goals for each
provider. CQUIN makes a proportion of a provider’s
yearly income conditional on reaching quality targets
agreed between the commissioner and provider. Most of
these targets are agreed locally, based on what the pro-
vider and the commissioner both ﬁnd important, but
there are also a limited number of national and regional
targets. CQUIN goals should include indicators on four
domains: safety, effectiveness, patient experience and
innovation.15 The proportion of the provider’s income
that is conditional on achieving the CQUIN target has
grown from 0.5% in 2009 to 2.5% in 2012.15
A recent evaluation of CQUIN15 concluded that while
it has helped commissioners and providers to identify
and prioritise local needs for quality improvement, the
impact on quality has been minimal. Several problems
were identiﬁed, including clinician dissatisfaction over
the way CQUIN goals were developed, and unclear and
imprecise outcome measures, which emphasised pro-
cesses rather than clinical outcomes. Freedom to use
local indicators, though potentially useful for engaging
clinicians, has also resulted in a lack of standardised
outcome measures. The short-term nature of the
CQUIN goals was also found to limit the motivation for
Trusts to make investment in measures to improve per-
formance. A quantitative analysis shows that of the nine
CQUIN goals analysed, only hip fracture returns show
an improvement.15
Kidney care
While for some patients with advanced kidney failure
conservative care is the preferred option, the majority
will opt for dialysis, as it remains an effective life-saving
and life-sustaining therapy. Although transplantation is
considered the gold standard for kidney replacement
therapy, available donor organs are a limited resource
with an average waiting time of 3.2 years for a kidney
transplant in the UK.16
Dialysis can be administered by a healthcare profes-
sional (typically a skilled nurse) in a hospital, or self-
administered in the patients’ own homes, independently
or with minimal assistance. It is administered using an
artiﬁcial kidney with access to the patient’s blood
(haemodialysis) or to the patient’s abdomen (peritoneal
dialysis (PD)). The management of advanced kidney
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failure in a patient might involve either form of dialysis
at home depending on their general health and per-
sonal preference. In Europe and North America,
in-centre or hospital-based haemodialysis, 3 times/week
for 4 h, is by far the most common therapy.1 17 18
Home haemodialysis (HHD) offers the ﬂexibility of
more frequent (5–6 times/week) and longer (7–8 h
overnight) dialysis sessions, and is conveniently and com-
fortably performed in the patient’s own home according
to their preferred schedule. Current evidence suggests
that more frequent or longer HHD is more physiological
and likely to improve clinical outcomes,19–21 and
patients report an improved quality of life.22 HHD may
not, however, be the right option for all patients. Choice
of dialysis modality is personal and contextual for each
patient and may change over time. It is a lifestyle choice
as well as a medical one, and decisions involve input
from the patient, the informal caregiver and healthcare
professionals.
There is a potential to save costs with HHD. Most eco-
nomic studies show that HHD is less costly than
in-centre haemodialysis,23–27 with all studies showing
reduced nursing costs for home dialysis patients. A com-
prehensive economic analysis will require consideration
not only of treatment costs, but also of costs associated
with home adaptations (eg, changes in the water supply)
and of beneﬁts such as reductions in travel and earlier
return to work. Whether there are cost savings when per-
forming frequent HHD is less clear, as more consumables
(ie, dialysers, needles, etc) may offset savings on
resource and infrastructure.28
In 2002 the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE) produced guidelines on home com-
pared with hospital haemodialysis for patients with end-
stage kidney disease.29 It is recommended that all
patients who are suitable for HHD should be offered
the choice of undertaking haemodialysis in the home or
in a hospital kidney centre. It was estimated that up to
15% of dialysis patients may choose to undertake HHD.
In 2004, the Department of Health published the
National Service Framework (NSF) for renal services,
which promotes patient-centred provision of kidney ser-
vices, including choice over HHD.30 In 2011, 1.7% of
patients on kidney replacement therapy (3.3% of all dia-
lysis patients) were on HHD.1
Another topic of interest in kidney care is the type of
vascular access that is used for patients on haemodialysis.
Access type for chronic haemodialysis can be perman-
ent, such as a native arteriovenous (AV) ﬁstula or an AV
graft surgically created in the lower arm, or semiperman-
ent, in the form of a tunnelled venous catheter. Patients
with an AV ﬁstula or graft are generally believed to have
better health outcomes than those with a catheter,31 and
suffer from fewer complications such as methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections.32 In
recent years there has been considerable emphasis on
increasing the use of permanent access via ﬁstula. The
zero tolerance approach in the NHS towards MRSA and
the fact that incidences of MRSA are one of the national
measures to calculate ﬁnancial bonuses (Quality
Premiums) for NHS clinical commissioning groups,
potentially inﬂuences the uptake of permanent vascular
access.33 Clinical practice guidelines published in 2011
by the Renal Association and the Vascular Society of
Great Britain and Ireland also promote the use of AV ﬁs-
tulas and grafts over catheters.34 Moreover, timely and
appropriate surgery for permanent vascular access is
one of ﬁve standards to be achieved in the NHS for
2014 as stated in the NSF for renal services.30
Additionally, a National Kidney Care Audit was under-
taken in both 2009 and 2010 to determine the extent of
ﬁstula use in the UK.35 36
Financial incentives in kidney care
As of 2011–2012, dialysis modalities (excluding acute
dialysis and paediatric dialysis) have been paid for by a
mandatory tariff under Payment by Results. Transport
and some medication costs are not included in this tariff
and covered by a different mechanism. PD, as a continu-
ous technique, is paid on a per day basis; in-centre
haemodialysis is paid per dialysis session.37 Trusts receive
the Best Practice Tariff for patients who receive in-centre
dialysis with an AV ﬁstula or graft, as opposed to dialysis
via a venous catheter,i to create an incentive in line with
the current guidelines on vascular access. The Best
Practice Tariff for vascular access is an incentive towards
using ﬁstulas/grafts for haemodialysis, as the tariff is
higher and the costs are lower than for dialysis with a
catheter. If the Trust reaches a predetermined propor-
tion of patients undergoing in-centre haemodialysis on a
ﬁstula, then its income for haemodialysis is comparable
to a situation in which there is no Best Practice Tariff
and prices are set at the national average cost. The pro-
portion of patients needed for equal income has gone
up from 75% in 2011–2012 to 80% in 2012–2013.38
In April 2012 HHD was given its own mandatory tariff;
previously a non-mandatory tariff was in place.38 39 This
tariff is paid on a per week basis, and amounts to the
same sum of money as the in-centre Best Practice Tariff
(ie, three in-centre dialysis sessions on an AV ﬁstula or
graft). This makes the income for HHD and in-centre
dialysis on a ﬁstula the same on a weekly basis. The
HHD tariff is meant as an incentive for providers to
expand their home programme, as the modality now
provides a consistent income39 which does not depend
on negotiations between the kidney centre and its com-
missioner; and the overall costs for HHD are presumed
to be lower than for in-centre haemodialysis. The tariff
for HHD is the same irrespective of the nature of vascu-
lar access and frequency of dialysis sessions performed at
home—typically 4 sessions/week, but ranging from 3 to
7 sessions/week.
iThe tariff is also higher in patients with blood-borne viruses37
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Since 2010 there have been several CQUIN targets
relating to home therapies (HHD and PD), in which a
locally negotiated proportion of patients have to be on
home therapy for a Trust to gain the reward.40 There
have also been other CQUIN targets in kidney care, for
example, aiming to reduce the time between a patient
starting on dialysis and being referred for a transplant.
In 2010 eleven hospitals had explicit CQUIN targets for
home therapies. We used Renal Registry data to
compare the percentages of patients on HHD and PD in
December 2009 and December 2010, for hospitals in
England with and without a CQUIN target for home
therapies. A Mann-Whitney U test shows a signiﬁcantly
higher increase in the percentage of patients on HHD
in the hospitals with a home therapies CQUIN target.
While this correlation does not prove a causal link, it
suggests that the relationship between CQUIN targets
and the uptake of HHD is worth investigating. For PD
there is a decline in percentage for both groups, with
the percentage declining at a lower rate in the kidney
centres which have a home therapies CQUIN target,
although this does not reach signiﬁcance. Table 1 shows
the changing percentage of prevalent patients on home
therapy before and after the introduction of the CQUIN
targets.41 42
In summary, the tariff for HHD should function as an
incentive, by design, because it generates the same
income as the more expensive alternative (in-centre
haemodialysis); the Best Practice Tariff should function
as an incentive for AV ﬁstula access for haemodialysis
because it pays more and is cheaper than the alternative
(dialysis via a catheter); and CQUIN is an incentive
because it provides additional (albeit relatively small)
payment when a certain percentage of patients remain
on a home therapy.
Aims of this study
Through this study we wish to understand the extent to
which the ﬁnancial drivers, such as the tariff and the
other payment mechanisms, motivate clinical kidney
centres in England to change their practices in dialysis.
We looked at all the payment structures in this single
clinical area in the study sites, in order to gain an
in-depth understanding of the relationship between
these structures and clinical decision-making.
We adopted a qualitative approach to investigate the
subjective experience of health professionals and man-
agers on payment structures that aim to improve quality
of kidney care. The subjective experience is important
as it correlates well with change behaviour, ultimately
informing whether payment structures could act as
incentives in the way policymakers have intended.
METHODS
We performed a qualitative study in the form of 45–60 min
in-depth semistructured interviews with 27 healthcare
professionals and managers in ﬁve kidney centres from
across England, serving a total of roughly 5.3 million
catchment population. We also conducted ﬁve back-
ground interviews with commissioners and industry
experts.
The ﬁve kidney centres were selected based on their
prevalence of HHD. This ranged between low (<3%),
medium (5–8%) and high (>8%) prevalence, with at least
one centre in each one of these categories at the time of
selection. Of the two centres with a prevalence below 3%,
one had a total dialysis population of over 600, the other
less than 200. The larger centre had only set up their
HHD programme in the past few years. Those centres with
a prevalence of 5–8% had total dialysis populations of
approximately 250 and 500. Each had historically had a
small HHD programme but had recently started develop-
ing it further. The centre with a prevalence of HHD of
over 8% had around 600 dialysis patients, and had been
growing their programme for over 10 years.
For each kidney centre we interviewed at least the fol-
lowing: one or more nurses, one or more consultant
nephrologists involved in HHD, and one or more of the
following: clinical director, ﬁnancial manager and
general manager. Interviews covered the organisation of
the dialysis service (with a focus on HHD), the tariff and
ﬁnancial aspects of dialysis provision, as well as attitudes
towards and opinions about the different dialysis
modalities.
The transcribed interviews were analysed by two
researchers using thematic analysis, a methodologically
and epistemologically ﬂexible approach. The analysis
was guided by the aims and the research questions of
the project and by the researcher’s active identiﬁcation
of themes, based on the accounts of the participants’
own views and experience.
This study was part of the BArriers to Successful
Implementation of Care in Home HaemoDialysis
(BASIC-HHD)43 study which includes an in-depth
organisational study which informs and provides a
context for this work.
RESULTS
Dialysis tariff
In order to understand the impact of the tariff on
kidney care, it is important to ﬁrst consider the way in
which costs are perceived in various kidney centres and
across NHS Trusts. Staff from the case study Trusts held
a range of opinions on whether the different tariffs were
sufﬁcient to cover the costs of the dialysis modalities
(see box 1). However, not all of the kidney centres had
sufﬁcient detail and clarity of the costs involved in differ-
ent modalities; rather, they were only aware of the costs
and income of the kidney centre as a whole and only
had partial knowledge of the costs of the individual
treatment modalities (even though Trusts have to submit
costs of each modality to the Department of Health as a
basis for the tariff ). This makes it difﬁcult for these
centres to compare tariffs against the true costs of these
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Table 1 CQUIN target (April 2010) and change in proportion of kidney patients on home therapy based on Renal Registry data.41 42
CQUIN target for 2011 unless stated
differently Home haemodialysis (%) Peritoneal dialysis (%)
Home
haemodialysis
Peritoneal
dialysis
December
2009
December
2010 Difference
December
2009
December
2010 Difference
Birmingham Heart of England Total 35% by 2015* 2.8 3.6 0.8 7.1 9.2 2.1
Birmingham QEH Total 35% by 2015* 2.0 2.9 0.9 15.6 15.1 −0.5
Dudley Group of Hospitals Total 35% by 2015* 0.9 0.9 0 26.4 28.2 1.8
Liverpool Aintree University Hospitals +1.7% +5.0% 2.1 4.4 2.3 4.8 4.4 −0.4
Liverpool Royal Infirmary +2.0% 20% total 2.6 3.8 1.2 17.9 14.5 −3.4
Royal Preston Hospital +1.0% +2.0% 4.7 4.8 0.1 13.8 11.2 −2.6
Salford Royal Infirmary +1.3% 20% total N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Shrewsbury & Telford Hospital Total 35% by 2015* 1.3 2.7 1.4 13 9.9 −3.1
University Hospital of North
Staffordshire
Total 35% by 2015* 1.6 4.4 2.8 19.3 19.9 0.6
Wirral University Teaching Hospital +2.3% +1.3% 1.4 1.8 0.4 15.8 16.6 0.8
Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals Total 35% by 2015* 0.9 1.3 0.4 14.6 18.6 4
Average England hospitals with
CQUIN
2.03 3.06 1.03 14.83 14.76 −0.07
Average England hospitals no
CQUIN
2.08 2.29 0.21 16.28 15.67 −0.61
Difference in averages 0.82† 0.54‡
*20% PD and 10% HHD.
†Significant difference at 0.05 level of significance (Mann-Whitney U test).
‡Non-significant difference at 0.05 level of significance (Mann-Whitney U test.
CQUIN, Commissioning for Quality and Innovation; HHD, home haemodialysis; N/A, not applicable; QEH, Queen Elizabeth Hospital.
Abm
a
I,JayantiA,Bayer
S,etal.BM
J
Open
2014;4:e004249.doi:10.1136/bm
jopen-2013-004249
5
O
p
e
n
A
c
c
e
s
s
modalities. An assessment such as whether a speciﬁc
modality is ﬁnancially beneﬁcial or loss-making is there-
fore a best estimate rather than a proven fact.
Opinions on the cost/income balance of HHD ranged
widely, from it generating a signiﬁcant proﬁt to it being
ﬁnancially detrimental to the kidney centre. Centres dif-
fered in how they accounted for the costs of training
patients for HHD. Training for HHD typically takes
place in-centre while the patient is dialysed. Extra costs
are incurred when training patients at the time of
in-centre dialysis, because of additional nursing input
that may be required in teaching. Some centres do not
consider the costs of training separately at all, viewing it
as part of in-centre dialysis expenses. Others see training
patients in self-care as additional expenditure, the costs
of which have to be recovered when patients start dialys-
ing at home. As most patients on HHD are also the
patients who are most likely to receive a transplant, it
can be seen as a loss of investment if they get a trans-
plant relatively soon after starting on HHD.
Interviewees’ perceptions on how long it takes for
HHD to bring in the same amount of money for the
Trust as in-centre dialysis ranged from a few weeks to
2 years. These differences were partly due to differences
in how long it takes to recoup the total upfront invest-
ment (training, home adaptations, and the costs of the
dialysis machine for centres which make an outright pur-
chase rather than lease). They were also the result of
real or assumed differences in operational costs of
HHD, and therefore the amount of money left for
paying for the upfront costs under the current tariff (see
box 1). Commissioners differed in opinion with regard
to whether HHD is cost saving and were aware of the
risk centres face if patients drop out of the programme
early (see box 2).
Another issue is the frequency of dialysis at home. In
one centre cost considerations inﬂuenced the frequency
of HHD sessions that were prescribed, but this was less
the case in other centres. While the weekly tariff for
HHD is ﬁxed, the costs for some HHD patients will be
higher than for others, depending on how often they
dialyse and consequently how many consumables they
use per week. In some of our case study Trusts the
acceptable frequency of dialysis for HHD patients had
been discussed, with some centres concluding that the
HHD patients who dialyse 3 times/week balance out
the costs of those choosing to dialyse 6 times/week
in the programme as a whole. One centre was convinced
that the Trust was losing money on frequent dialysis but
refused to let cost inﬂuence the quality of patient care.
In another centre patients were not allowed to dialyse
more than 4 times/week because of cost constraints
under the current tariff. Centres differed in their estima-
tion of how much money is saved by reduced nursing
time, and how many extra dialysis sessions this would
cover in terms of consumables (see box 3).
Other uncertainties and local differences in the cost
of HHD arise from how in-centre respite care or patient
retraining for HHD is accounted for, how overheads
from the kidney centres for different modalities are cal-
culated, and whether the dedicated dialysis machine
that each individual patient will need at home is pur-
chased or leased.
In summary, there appears to be no consistency
among kidney centres in the way the costs of HHD are
understood. It is therefore unclear whether the appar-
ent cost differences in HHD were still applicable, if the
cost calculations were uniform in each centre.
Best Practice Tariff
The Best Practice Tariff for patients doing haemodialysis
in-centre via ﬁstula/graft had led the case study centres
to put considerable emphasis on making sure patients
get ﬁstula surgery well before they start dialysis, as well
Box 1
“Because we haven’t devolved the costs down on each modality, I
couldn’t tell you whether PD [peritoneal dialysis] or haemo[dialy-
sis] or whatever was more profitable for us at the moment.”
(Centre 4, interviewee 1)
“If we don’t get beyond 2 years with a patient that’s gone home
[onto home haemodialysis], as is often the case because they
tend to be the healthier ones that are far more likely to get a
transplant,…we never get past that 2-year point to be able to
start seeing some return on all the investment that we’ve made.
So, if the turnover of patients is high, it actually is very detrimen-
tal, financially, to the service.” (Centre 2, interviewee 4)
“Our profitability starts when they’re at home and anything that
prepares them for home is integrated into the main haemodialysis
programme. Maybe it’s a matter of just how you view it.” (Centre 1,
interviewee 6)
“We lose money…on those patients for the first 2 years because
we invest so much time in their training, so much manpower and
the home visits, etc., buying the machines, the technician
support. And all those things added up, it’s not until you get past
that 2-year stage that we actually start seeing a little bit of a com-
parison with in-centre patients.” (Centre 2, interviewee 4)
Box 2
“Although there’s been a lot of talk about home haemodialysis,
when I came to starting to look at the evidence base for this, it
isn’t really that strong as in the economics of it” (Commissioner 1)
“It’s cheaper. It is a lot cheaper to dialyse at home.”
(Commissioner 2)
“So you set up somebody’s home, you put the machine in, and
get them trained, you start them off and 3 months down the road
they have a transplant. …You lose quite a lot of money.”
(Commissioner 1)
“So probably the first year the Trust won’t be making a profit on
that tariff but after that they would be, so it’s a good tariff.”
(Commissioner 2)
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as trying to aim for patients who dialyse using a vascular
catheter to switch to a ﬁstula (see box 4).
The opinions of interviewees on the Best Practice
Tariff were generally negative. The 80% target for
patients on a ﬁstula was seen as very high and there were
concerns that it encourages centres to create AV ﬁstulae
in patients who might not beneﬁt more from the
surgery. There were also ethical concerns around patient
choice—some patients may not want surgery for a ﬁstula
to avoid the need for cannulation. The interviewees
emphasised that kidney centres should not direct
patients to have vascular surgery for dialysis, conﬂicted
by the higher Best Practice Tariff (see box 5).
Commissioning for Quality and Innovation schemes
The kidney centres we interviewed were all making
efforts to reach their home therapy CQUIN targets, for
instance by improving patient education in the predialy-
sis phase. One commissioner stressed the positive impact
CQUIN schemes have had on the uptake of home
therapies:
We put CQUINS in to help push the home therapy per-
centages,…working with the network on what percen-
tages they should be. And it has made a big difference…
You can see that Trusts are now more in tune with [this
approach] (Commissioner 2).
However, the clinical centres raised concerns about
these targets. Since it is usually the younger, healthier
patients who go onto home therapies, these are also the
patients most likely to receive a kidney transplant.
A centre with a high transplant rate might therefore
ﬁnd it more challenging to reach or sustain its home
therapy CQUIN target. As one interviewee put it, Should
I stop transplantation to meet the CQUINs? (Centre 5, inter-
viewee 2).
Just as with the Best Practice Tariff, another important
factor is patient choice. Setting a CQUIN target on an
issue that is based to a great extent on patient choice
and their perceptions of the modality and its implica-
tions means that a Trust risks being penalised if insufﬁ-
cient patients wish to dialyse at home (see box 6). This
may lead to encouragement of patients towards home
therapy mainly for ﬁnancial reasons, potentially with
inadequate support structures and set up. One of the
centres had discussed this issue with their commissioner,
and they agreed on a more ﬂexible target. They would
receive the reward for reaching their home therapies
target, or if a questionnaire showed that new patients
were given the opportunity to make an educated choice.
According to one commissioner, providing it was clear
that the centre was making ‘active positive changes’, it
would be awarded the CQUIN payment even if it was
failing to meet the target.
However, it was also clear that ﬂexibility was possible
under the CQUIN framework. One of the centres had
agreed a 5-year CQUIN plan with their commissioner,
with the target proportion of patients who should be on
home therapies increasing each year, clearly focusing on
a longer term sustainable model, beyond the life of the
CQUIN.
Box 3
“There are a lot of people doing three times, three and a half
times, four times a week. Even if you had 10% or 20% patients
doing five or six times a week, you’ve made enough savings here
to offset that.”(Centre 1, interviewee 6)
“If they dialyse more than three times a week, it’s not enough
because the tariff…only ... gives you three times a week.” (Centre
2, interviewee 4)
“Patients can have a maximum four sessions of home haemodi-
alysis a week. So if somebody needs a fifth session it’s not paid
for, so they can’t have a fifth session.” (Centre 5, interviewee 2)
Box 4
“The only tariff I’m sort of aware of at the minute is looking at
their access because…they get more money, I think, for a fistula
rather than a line, so there’s a massive push towards trying to get
their access sorted so we do get that tariff in” (Centre 1, inter-
viewee 8)
“The surgeons say, there’s no such thing as an emergency fistula.
They’re now changing their minds and actually thinking, no, we
need to actually bring somebody forward and do their operation
sooner otherwise they’re going to end up with a line. So we’re
much, much tighter about putting lines into people and putting
tunnelled lines in when it’s going to be long term” (Centre 3,
interviewee 5)
“There is an industry of looking at why patients start dialysis on
lines, why patients are on lines, what can we do for the patients
that are on lines to get them a fistula, what can we do with
patients with fistulas to prevent them needing a line whereas that
maybe time that’s spent doing that, could be better spent doing
something else.” (Centre 3, interviewee 1)
Box 5
“The one that possibly is lunacy is the use of lines versus fistula
in the Best Practice Tariff…It could be a slight perverse tariff that
you’ve got elderly people who are actually going to go for an
operation…one or 2 years before they’re end-stage when it’s diffi-
cult to predict and could start dialysis perfectly adequately and
safely on a line, but the Best Practice Tariff suggests that we lose
money if we try to do that. So there may be an issue around
putting fistulas in people who probably aren’t going to benefit…,
you may have multiple attempts of forming a fistula and then fail
and setup on a line, when you could probably predict that that
would happen and they should really just start on a line.” (Centre 3,
interviewee 1)
“The tariff is working towards incentivising more patients to have
a fistula, but at the end of the day you’ve still got that patient
choice which you can’t force somebody…We shouldn’t be
saying, well, you ought to have this done because it gives us
more money. The idea is to provide a quality service that the
patient is happy and this is the way we can treat the patient and
that’s the way it should be.” (Centre 1, interviewee 7)
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DISCUSSION
Our interviews have shown that not all kidney centres in
England look at the costs of the different dialysis modal-
ities in detail, focusing mainly on the total costs and
income of the centre. This in itself is not surprising.
Until April 2011 kidney care was covered by block con-
tracts between the Trust and its commissioner. In this
arrangement, the kidney centre usually received a prede-
termined sum of money per patient, regardless of the
modality.44 There are no reference costs for HHD, but a
ﬁnancial audit by the Kidney Dialysis Project Group in
preparation for the reference costs exercise showed that
Trusts report costs for HHD ranging from £28 to £133
per session.45 This may reﬂect an actual difference in
costs or a difference in how providers disaggregate and
record costs.12 The costing studies available in the litera-
ture do also not necessarily reﬂect the method by which
kidney centres in our study sample calculate their costs.
The HHD tariff was intended as an incentive for this
modality39 and the unexplained variation in estimated
costs impacts on how a certain modality can be incenti-
vised with a tariff. One of the centres did not see the
tariff for HHD as an incentive because it is not until
the second year of a HHD patient’s treatment that the
net income from in-centre and HHD is the same. There
was also concern about the turnover of patients on
HHD and its adverse impact on costs as upfront invest-
ment is lost.
Some kidney centres struggle to know whether the
HHD tariff is an incentive or not: if they do not know
the costs of a speciﬁc modality, they are unlikely to
understand the additional value of the tariffs. This is
similar to a ﬁnding in an early study of Payment by
Results46 where it was observed that there was ‘evident
uncertainty about the reliability of price signals given by
the Payment by Results tariff’ to incentivise providers to
select services with a high price-cost margin.
While the national tariff for HHD was not seen as an
incentive by all participants in our study, CQUIN targets
were seen as an encouragement to improve numbers of
patients on HHD, even though the payment is relatively
small compared to the total income a Trust earns for
dialysis services. It gives centres an extra, very visible sum
of money for the current year. Even the case study
kidney centre that perceived HHD as ﬁnancially detri-
mental has expanded its home programme in order to
reach the CQUIN target and receive the additional
income. It seems that the additional income outweighs
any prevailing uncertainty around the costs of HHD. As
CQUIN is an additional incentive decoupled from the
base payment, this may contribute to the effectiveness of
the model. The beneﬁts of such incentives have been
suggested in previous works.8 The positive results of
both our quantitative analysis (see table 1) and our
qualitative ﬁndings on the CQUIN target and uptake of
HHD are in contrast to a quantitative evaluation of
CQUIN which shows a relative improvement in only one
out of nine studied CQUIN goals.15
The Best Practice Tariff for vascular access is also seen
as a clear incentive because dialysis with an AV ﬁstula or
graft attracts the higher tariff and is regarded as the
cheaper longer term option for vascular access. The
Best Practice Tariff was implemented when improve-
ments in vascular access were widely considered as a
crucial issue in the care for dialysis patients and it was
made the subject of an NSF standard30 and a national
audit.35 36 This might have given additional impetus to
the uptake of AV ﬁstulae.
The evaluation of the introduction of Best Practice
Tariffs for the Department of Health13 exposed criticism
on the vascular access Best Practice Tariff that is similar
to that encountered in our study. The required percent-
age set in the Best Practice Tariff should in theory take
into account issues around patient choice and the
unsuitability of some patients for a particular treatment
modality.31 In practice, however, concerns were reported
in our study over the tension between patient choice
and the Best Practice Tariff, from fears that a centre may
be ﬁnancially ‘penalised’ if patients do not want an AV
ﬁstula or graft to concerns that the incentive to create
AV ﬁstula may be based on the ﬁnancial incentive and
not only on clinical suitability and selection process.
We also found an ethical dilemma between CQUIN
targets for home therapies and patient choice. As one
participant said, if a CQUIN target for HHD has not
been attained but patients have made educated choices
then the centre does not deserve to be penalised. In this
case, the centre and commissioner bypassed the poten-
tial pitfall by making educated patient choice an equally
important indicator for reaching the CQUIN target.
CQUIN targets are generally used to reach a speciﬁc
Box 6
“The CQUIN targets drive our practice. They’re again, a bit of a
double-edged sword. You can be under the microscope if you’re
not achieving. And you can be sending patients home, but there
can be things happening outside your control, like transplants
and death, and things like this.” (Centre 2, interviewee 1)
“When we were asked before about CQUIN targets, I said, if we’ve
been round and canvassed every single patient in our unit, and
they are doing what they should be doing, and we haven’t hit
targets because they are doing what they want to do…I don’t
think we should be penalised for that.” (Centre 4, interviewee 2)
“If there is feasibility without affecting people and patient care…
you should meet the CQUIN.” (Centre 5, interviewee 2)
“Concerns were expressed about the length of time required to
make changes to centres to meet the target, compared with the
size and duration of the resulting CQUIN rewards. Moreover,
because CQUINs only give a monetary reward for 1 year, this was
seen by some as insufficient incentive for the effort of changing
local practices. According to one interviewee,
“[we] soon realised that what [we] were signing up for was actu-
ally a very short-term deal … Why do we want to worry about
this amount of money? We might just be doing fine. Is it worth
it?” (Centre 1, interviewee 6)
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target over 1 year. Some commissioners have, however,
negotiated a multiyear home therapy CQUIN target,
with the target percentage increasing each year. This
overcomes the potential problem, raised in our inter-
views and in a recent evaluation of CQUIN,15 that there
might be less of an incentive to invest in a relatively
small, short-term target.
While decoupling incentives from the base payment
appears to be promising (ie, via CQUIN type payment
structures), changes to the tariff might also foster the
uptake of HHD. To make the tariff for HHD a true
incentive for kidney centres, they could be reimbursed
per HHD session. This would be an approach somewhat
similar to the Best Practice Tariff for vascular access in
that the cost advantage becomes clearer. Because
expenses for more frequent dialysis sessions would be
covered, an equal payment for HHD and hospital
haemodialysis sessions would be a clearer incentive.
However, in a resource-constrained NHS this will
increase the immediate expenditure by commissioning
bodies.
According to the 2008 Payment by Results Interim
Report commissioners are likely to view paying per HHD
session as undesirable because the costs are not linear
due to the investment in a dedicated dialysis machine
for each patient and variable depreciation.45 On the
other hand it has been argued that the long-term health
beneﬁts of frequent haemodialysis, such as lower hospi-
talisation rates, may outweigh the initial costs. And even
though some kidney centres are not convinced that
HHD is ﬁnancially beneﬁcial for their Trust, others
claim that their Trust is already making a signiﬁcant
proﬁt on HHD under the current tariff. If anything, this
strongly suggests that more research into actual costs
breakdown by modality at a unit level is needed in order
to provide suitable tariff.
A speciﬁc feature of HHD is that a signiﬁcant initial
(and individual) investment in a speciﬁc patient has to
be made upfront, but the income to cover this expense
is only earned back over time as long as that patient
receives HHD. A potential approach to reduce the risk
for Trusts would therefore be to unbundle the initial
investment costs such as home conversions and extra
training, and pay separately for them.
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
Our qualitative study involved ﬁve kidney centres. We
are unable to present a comprehensive evaluation of pay
for performance in kidney care in general. We believe
that variable prevalence of HHD in these geographically
distinct study sites provide credible data and insight into
the issues involved that need further research, on a
wider scale. This paper does not examine the actual
costs and ﬁnancial beneﬁts of different dialysis modal-
ities or the inﬂuences of patient preferences and wider
organisational factors in decision-making around kidney
care treatment modalities. While these factors will shape
the uptake of a treatment modality, we are conﬁdent
that the highlighted issues are of importance and also of
relevance beyond the case study centres, and point to
concerns which should be taken into account in devel-
oping ﬁnancial frameworks for kidney care.
Future research
In order for the tariff to be set in a way that it acts as an
incentive, it will be important to better understand
actual and perceived costs in kidney centres in England.
CONCLUSION
The impact of ﬁnancial incentives designed at a policy
level is inﬂuenced by the understanding of cost and ben-
eﬁts at the operational level. In a situation where costs
are unclear, incentives which are based on the improve-
ment of proﬁt margins have a smaller impact than
incentives which provide an additional direct payment,
even if this extra ﬁnancial support is relatively small.
When trying to provide an incentive by paying the
same amount of money for a service that is assumed to
be cheaper by policymakers, it is important that local
decision-makers have a clear view of the costs and agree
that this service is cheaper. Because kidney centres in
England are not clear on the costs of HHD, being paid
the same amount of money as in-centre haemodialysis is
not seen as an incentive.
Paying a higher tariff for a service that is clearly
cheaper, or giving an additional sum of money when a
speciﬁc target is reached, is seen as an incentive. This
can be observed in the cases of the Best Practice Tariff
for in-centre dialysis on a ﬁstula or graft, and the
CQUIN targets for home therapies.
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